575 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94105-2856
Telephone: (415) 894-7700
Fax: (415) 894-0583
Incorporated: 1906 as Standard Oil Company (California)
Sales: $104.41 billion (2001)
Stock Exchanges: New York Pacific
Ticker Symbol: CVX
NAIC: 211111 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction; 324110 Petroleum Refineries; 325110 Petrochemical Manufacturing; 447110 Gasoline Stations with Convenience Stores; 447190 Other Gasoline Stations; 486110 Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil; 486210 Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas; 486910 Pipeline Transportation of Refined Petroleum Products
At the heart of the ChevronTexaco Way is our vision ... to be the global energy company most admired for its people, partnership and performance. Our vision means: Providing energy products and services that are vital to society's quality of life. Being known as people with superior capabilities and commitment, both as individuals and as an organization. Thinking and behaving globally, and valuing the positive influence this has on our company. Being the partner of choice because we best exemplify collaboration. Delivering world-class performance. Earning the admiration of all our stakeholders--investors, customers, host governments, local communities and our employees--not only for the goals we achieve but how we achieve them.
1879: Pacific Coast Oil Company is founded in California.
1900: Pacific Coast is purchased by the Standard Oil Trust.
1906: Pacific Coast is merged with Standard Oil of Iowa to form Standard Oil Company (California), known as Socal.
1911: The Standard Oil Trust is ordered dissolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, and Socal emerges as an independent firm officially called Standard Oil (California).
1926: Socal merges with Pacific Oil Company, a division of Southern Pacific Railroad Company; company name is changed to Standard Oil Company of California.
1930: Socal strikes oil in Bahrain, beginning the firm's involvement in the Middle East.
1933: Company gains drilling rights in Saudi Arabia.
1936: Socal sells 50 percent of its drilling rights in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to the Texas Company (later Texaco Inc.), forming a joint venture called the California-Texas Oil Company (Caltex); the Saudi arm of the Caltex venture is later called Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco).
1948: 30 percent of Aramco is sold to Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) and 10 percent to Socony-Vacuum Oil Company.
1961: Socal purchases Standard Oil Company of Kentucky to market gasoline in the southeastern United States.
1970s:Company is rocked by the OPEC oil embargo and the nationalization of a number of Caltex holdings.
1980: The government of Saudi Arabia nationalizes Aramco.
1984: Socal changes its name to Chevron Corporation, Chevron having become the firm's main marketing brand; company purchases Gulf Corporation for $13.2 billion.
1993: Chevron forms joint venture with the Republic of Kazakhstan to develop the huge Tengiz oil field.
1996: Company sells its natural gas business to Natural Gas Clearinghouse, gaining a 27 percent stake in a firm later called Dynegy Inc.
2000: Chevron combines its worldwide chemical operations with those of Phillips Petroleum Company, forming a 50-50 joint venture called Chevron Phillips Chemical Company.
2001: Chevron acquires Texaco in a $45 billion deal, forming ChevronTexaco Corporation.
ChevronTexaco Corporation is the creation of the 2001 merger of California-based Chevron Corporation, one of the many progeny of the Standard Oil Trust, and Texaco Inc., a company whose history traces back to the early boom years of the Texas oil industry. The two firms' histories previously began to intertwine in the 1930s with the formation of the Caltex and Aramco ventures in the Middle East. ChevronTexaco began its existence as the number two U.S.-based integrated oil company (behind Exxon Mobil Corporation) and number four in the world, behind Exxon Mobil, BP p.l.c., and Royal Dutch/Shell Group. The company had some 11.5 billion barrels of oil and gas reserves and had daily production of 2.7 million barrels. Major producing areas included the Gulf of Mexico, California, Texas, Canada, Kazakhstan, Argentina, Angola, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Venezuela, Australia, Indonesia, Thailand, China, Papua New Guinea, the North Sea, and the Middle East. On the downstream side, ChevronTexaco operated 22 refineries around the world and more than 25,000 service stations on six continents under such brands as Chevron, Texaco, Caltex, Delo, and Havoline. Within the United States, the company's marketing operations were strongest in the western, southwestern, and southern regions of the country. Among the company's other operations and interests were a 50 percent interest in Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LLC, a major petrochemical manufacturer (the other 50 percent was held by Phillips Petroleum Corporation); equity interests in 47 power projects worldwide; and a 27 percent stake in Dynegy, Inc., a marketer and trader of energy products, including electricity, natural gas, and coal.
The Chevron side of the corporation grew from its modest California origins in the late 19th century to become a major power in the international oil market. Its dramatic discoveries in Saudi Arabia gave Chevron a strong position in the world's largest oil region and helped fuel 20 years of record earnings in the postwar era. The rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the early 1970s deprived Chevron of its comfortable Middle East position, causing considerable anxiety and a determined search for new domestic oil resources at a company long dependent on foreign supplies. The firm's 1984 purchase of Gulf Corporation--at $13.2 billion, the largest industrial transaction to that date--more than doubled Chevron's oil and gas reserves but failed to bring its profit record back to pre-1973 levels of performance. By the mid-to-late 1990s, however, Chevron was posting strong earnings, a result of higher gasoline prices and the company's restructuring and cost-cutting efforts.
Chevron's oldest direct ancestor is the Pacific Coast Oil Company, founded in 1879 by Frederick Taylor and a group of investors. Several years before, Taylor, like many other Californians, had begun prospecting for oil in the rugged canyons north of Los Angeles; unlike most prospectors, Taylor found what he was looking for, and his Pico Well #4 was soon the state's most productive. Following its incorporation, Pacific Coast developed a method for refining the heavy California oil into an acceptable grade of kerosene, then the most popular lighting source, and the company's fortunes prospered. By the turn of the century Pacific had assembled a team of producing wells in the area of Newhall, California, and built a refinery at Alameda Point across the San Francisco Bay from San Francisco. It also owned both railroad tank cars and the George Loomis, an oceangoing tanker, to transport its crude from the field to the refinery.
One of Pacific Coast's best customers was Standard Oil Company of Iowa, a marketing subsidiary of the New Jersey-headquartered Standard Oil Trust. Iowa Standard had been active in northern California since 1885, selling both Standard's own eastern oil and also large quantities of kerosene purchased from Pacific Coast and the other local oil companies. The West Coast was important to Standard Oil Company of New Jersey not only as a market in itself but also as a source of crude for sale to its Asian subsidiaries. Jersey Standard thus became increasingly attracted to the area and in the late 1890s tried to buy Union Oil Company, the state leader. The attempt failed, but in 1900 Pacific Coast agreed to sell its stock to Jersey Standard for $761,000 with the understanding that Pacific Coast would produce, refine, and distribute oil for marketing and sale by Iowa Standard representatives. W.H. Tilford and H.M. Tilford, two brothers who were longtime employees of Standard Oil, assumed the leadership of Iowa Standard and Pacific Coast, respectively.
Drawing on Jersey Standard's strength, Pacific Coast immediately built the state's largest refinery at Point Richmond on San Francisco Bay and a set of pipelines to bring oil from its San Joaquin Valley wells to the refinery. Its crude production rose steeply over the next decade, yielding 2.6 million barrels a year by 1911, or 20 times the total for 1900. The bulk of Pacific Coast's holdings were in the Coalinga and Midway fields in the southern half of California, with wells rich enough to supply Iowa Standard with an increasing volume of crude but never enough to satisfy its many marketing outlets. Indeed, even in 1911 Pacific Coast was producing a mere 2.3 percent of the state's crude, forcing partner Iowa Standard to buy most of its crude from outside suppliers such as Union Oil and Puente Oil.
By that date, however, Pacific Coast and Iowa Standard were no longer operating as separate companies. In 1906 Jersey Standard had brought together its two West Coast subsidiaries into a single entity called Standard Oil Company (California), generally known thereafter as Socal. Jersey Standard recognized the future importance of the West and quickly increased the new company's capital from $1 million to $25 million. Socal added a second refinery at El Segundo, near Los Angeles, and vigorously pursued the growing markets for kerosene and gasoline in both the western United States and Asia. Able to realize considerable transportation savings by using West Coast oil for the Pacific markets of its parent company, Socal was soon selling as much as 80 percent of its kerosene overseas. Socal's head chemist, Eric A. Starke, was chiefly responsible for several breakthroughs in the refining of California's heavy crude into usable kerosene, and by 1911, Socal was the state leader in kerosene production.
The early strengths of Socal lay in refining and marketing. Its large, efficient refineries used approximately 20 percent of California's entire crude production, much more than Socal's own wells could supply. To keep the refineries and pipelines full, Socal bought crude from Union Oil and in return handled a portion of the marketing and sale of Union kerosene and naphtha. In the sale of kerosene and gasoline, Socal maintained a near-total control of the market in 1906, supplying 95 percent of the kerosene and 85 percent of the gasoline and naphtha purchased in its marketing area of California, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska, although its share dipped somewhat in the next five years. When necessary, Socal used its dominant position to inhibit competition by deep price cutting. By the time of the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust in 1911, Socal, like many of the Standard subsidiaries, had become the overwhelming leader in the refining and marketing of oil in its region while lagging somewhat in the production of crude.
From 1911 to World War II: Growth As an Independent Company
In 11 short years the strength of Standard Oil and a vigorous Western economy combined to increase Socal's net book value from a few million dollars in 1900 to $39 million. It was in 1911, however, that Jersey Standard, the holding company for Socal and the entire Standard Oil family, was ordered dissolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to break its monopolistic hold on the oil industry. As one of 34 independent units carved out of the former parent company, Socal, sporting a new official name of Standard Oil (California), would have to do without Standard's financial backing, but the new competitor hardly faced the world unarmed. Socal kept its dominant marketing and refining position, its extensive network of critical pipelines, a modest but growing fleet of oil tankers, its many oil wells, and, most helpfully, some $14 million in retained earnings. The latter proved useful in Socal's subsequent rapid expansion, as did California's growing popularity among U.S. citizens looking for a fresh start in life. The state population shot up quickly, and most of the new residents found that they depended on the automobile--and, hence, on gasoline--to navigate the state's many highway miles.
The years leading up to World War I saw a marked increase in Socal's production of crude. From a base of about 3 percent of the state's production in the early part of the century, Socal rode a series of successful oil strikes to a remarkable 26 percent of nationwide crude production in 1919. The company expanded
In the late 1920s Socal's posture changed. At that time Gulf Corporation was unable to interest its fellow partners in Iraq Petroleum Company in the oil rights to Bahrain, a small group of islands off the coast of Saudi Arabia. Iraq Petroleum was then the chief cartel of oil companies operating in the Middle East, and its members were restricted by the Red Line Agreement of 1928 from engaging in oil development independently of the entire group. Gulf was therefore unable to proceed with its Bahrain concession and sold its rights for $50,000 to Socal, which was prodded by Maurice Lombardi and William Berg, two members of its board of directors. This venture proved successful. In 1930 Socal geologists struck oil in Bahrain, and within a few years, the California company had joined the ranks of international marketers of oil.
Bahrain's real importance, however, lay in its proximity to the vast fields of neighboring Saudi Arabia. The richest of all oil reserves lay beneath an inhospitable desert and until the early 1930s was left alone by the oil prospectors. But at that time, encouraged by the initial successes at Bahrain, Saudi Arabia's King Ibn Saud hired a U.S. geologist to study his country's potential oil reserves. The geologist, Karl Twitchell, liked what he saw and tried on behalf of the king to sell the concession to a number of U.S. oil companies. None was interested except the now adventurous Socal, which in 1933 won a modest bidding war and obtained drilling rights for a £5,000 annual fee and a loan of £50,000. After initial exploration revealed the fantastic extent of Arabian oil, Socal executives realized that the company would need access to markets far larger than its own meager foreign holdings, and in 1936 Socal sold 50 percent of its drilling rights in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to the Texas Company, later Texaco, the only other major oil company not bound by the Red Line Agreement. Thus was created the California-Texas Oil Company (Caltex). Once the oil started flowing in 1939, King Saud was so pleased with his partners and the profits they generated for his impoverished country that he increased the size of their concession to 440,000 square miles, an area the size of Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and New Mexico combined.
Socal and the Texas Company agreed to market their products under the brand name Caltex and developed excellent representation in both Europe and the Far East, especially in Japan. The new partners realized soon after the end of World War II, however, that the Saudi oil fields were too big even for the both of them, and in 1948, to raise further capital, they sold 40 percent of the recently formed Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) for $450 million--30 percent going to Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), forerunner of Exxon Corporation, and 10 percent to Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, forerunner of Mobil Corporation--leaving the two original partners with 30 percent each. With its crude supply secure for the foreseeable future, Socal was able to market oil around the world, as well as in North America's fastest-growing demographic region, California and the Pacific Coast. As later Chairman R. Gwin Follis put it, Saudi Arabia was a "jackpot beyond belief," supplying Caltex markets overseas with unlimited amounts of low-priced, high-grade oil. By the mid-1950s Socal was getting one-third of its crude production out of Aramco and, more significantly, calculated that Saudi Arabia accounted for two-thirds of its reserve supply. Other important fields had been discovered in Sumatra and Venezuela, but Socal was particularly dependent on its Aramco concession for crude.
On the domestic scene, Socal by 1949 had grown into one of the few American companies with $1 billion in assets. No longer the number one domestic crude producer, Socal was still among the leaders and had recently made plentiful strikes in Louisiana and Texas, as well as in its native California. In addition to its original refineries at Point Richmond and El Segundo, Socal had added new facilities in Bakersfield, California, and in Salt Lake City, Utah. Socal's marketing territory included at least some representation in 15 western states and a recent, limited foray into the northeastern United States, mainly as an outlet for some of its cheap Middle Eastern oil. The heart of Socal territory was still west of the Rocky Mountains, where the company continued to control about 28 percent of the retail market during the postwar years, a far cry from the 90 percent it owned at the turn of the century but still easily a dominant share in the nation's leading automotive region.
In the two decades following the war the U.S. economy became completely dependent upon oil. As both a cause and an effect of this trend, the world was awash in oil. The Middle East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia all contributed mightily to a prolonged glut, which steadily lowered the price of oil in real dollars. The enormous growth in world consumption assured Socal of a progressive rise in sales and a concomitant increase in profits at an annual rate of about 5.5 percent. By 1957, for example, Socal was selling $1.7 billion worth of oil products annually and ranked as the world's seventh largest oil concern. Its California base offered Socal a number of advantages in the prevailing buyer's market. By drawing upon its own local wells for the bulk of its U.S. sales, Socal was able to keep its transportation costs lower than most of its competitors, and California's zooming population and automobile-oriented economy afforded an ideal marketplace. As a result, Socal consistently had one of the best profit ratios among all oil companies during the 1950s and 1960s.
California crude production had begun to slow, however, and along with the rest of the world Socal grew ever more dependent on Middle Eastern oil for its overall health. The rich Bay Marchand strike off the Louisiana coast helped stem the tide temporarily. By 1961 Socal was drawing 27.9 million barrels per year from Marchand and had bought Standard Oil Company of Kentucky to market its gasoline in the southeastern United States. But the added domestic production only masked Socal's increasing reliance on Saudi Arabian oil, which by 1971 provided more than three-quarters of Socal's proven reserves. As long as the Middle Eastern countries remained cooperative, such an imbalance was not of great concern, and by vigorously selling its cheap Middle Eastern oil in Europe and Asia, Socal was able to rack up a perfect record of profit increases every year in the 1960s. By 1970, 20 percent of Socal's $4 billion in sales was generated in the Far East, with Japan again providing the lion's share of that figure. The firm's European gas stations, owned jointly with Texaco until 1967, numbered 8,000.
Challenge of OPEC Beginning in the 1970s
The world oil picture had changed fundamentally by 1970, however. The 20-year oil surplus had given way in the face of rampant consumption to a general and increasing shortage, a shift soon taken advantage of by OPEC members. In 1973 and 1974 OPEC effectively took control of oil at its source and engineered a fourfold increase in the base price of oil. Socal was now able to rely on its Saudi partner for only a tiny price advantage over the general rate and it was no longer in legal control of sufficient crude to supply its worldwide or domestic demand. The sudden shift in oil politics revealed a number of Socal shortcomings. Though it had 17,000 gas stations in 39 U.S. states, Socal was not a skilled marketer either in the United States or in Europe, where its former partner, Texaco, had supplied local marketing savvy. In its home state of California, for example, Socal's market share was 16 percent and continuing to drop and Socal had missed out on both the North Sea and Alaskan oil discoveries of the late 1960s. Furthermore, the OPEC-spawned upheaval included the nationalization of a number of Caltex holdings in the Middle East, and in 1978 Caltex Oil Refining (India) Ltd. was nationalized by the government of India. A further blow to Socal's overseas operations came in 1980 when the government of Saudi Arabia nationalized Aramco.
Socal responded to these problems by merging all of its domestic marketing into a single unit, Chevron USA, and began cutting employment, at first gradually and later more deeply. Also, Socal stepped up its domestic exploration efforts while moving into alternative sources of energy, such as shale, coal, and uranium. In 1981 the company made a $4 billion bid for AMAX Inc., a leader in coal and metal mining but had to settle for a 20 percent stake. In 1984 Standard Oil Company of California changed its name to Chevron Corporation, tying the company more directly with its main marketing brand. Also in 1984, after a decade of sporadic attempts to lessen its dependence on the volatile Middle East, Chevron Corporation met its short-term oil needs in a more direct fashion: it bought Gulf Corporation.
The $13.2 billion purchase, at that time the largest in the history of U.S. business, more than doubled Chevron's proven reserves and created a new giant in the U.S. oil industry, with Chevron now the leading domestic retailer of gasoline and, briefly, the second largest oil company by assets. Certain factors made the move appear ill-timed, however. Oil prices had peaked around 1980 and begun a long slide that continued until the Gulf War of 1990, which meant that Chevron had saddled itself with a $12 billion debt at a time of shrinking sales. As a result, it was not easy for Chevron to sell off assets as quickly as desired, both to reduce debt and to eliminate the many areas of overlap created by the merger. Chevron eventually rid itself of Gulf's Canadian operations and all of Gulf's gas stations in the northeastern and southeastern United States, paring 16,000 jobs in the meantime, but oil analysts pointed to such key figures as profit per employee and return of capital as evidence of Chevron's continued poor performance.
Developments in the 1990s
In the early 1990s Chevron began publicizing its environmental programs, a response in part to public pressure on all oil companies for more responsible environmental policies. From 1989 to 1993 Chevron Shipping Company had the best overall safety record among major oil companies. In 1993, while transporting nearly 625 million barrels of crude oil, Chevron Shipping spilled an amount equaling less than four barrels. During this same period, Chevron utilities supervisor Pete Duda recognized an opportunity to convert an abandoned wastewater treatment pond into a 90-acre wetland. Fresh water and new vegetation were added to the site, and by 1994 the area was attracting a variety of birds and other wildlife, as well as the attention of the National Audubon Society, National Geographic, and the California Department of Fish and Game. The conversion saved Chevron millions, as conventional closure of the site would have cost about $20 million.
Financially the company began the 1990s with less than glowing returns. Chevron's 1989 results were poor, and in that year's annual report, Chairman Kenneth Derr announced a program to upgrade the company's efficiency and outlined as well a five-year goal: "a return on stockholders' investment that exceeds the performance of our strongest competitors." The company also took important new initiatives. In 1993 Chevron entered into a partnership with the Republic of Kazakhstan to develop the Tengiz oil field, one of the largest ever discovered in the area.
In 1994, five years after Derr's announcement, Chevron had met its goal for stockholders, largely through restructuring and efforts to cut costs and improve efficiency. From 1989 to 1993 Chevron cut operating costs by more than $1 per barrel and the company's stock rose to an 18.9 percent return, compared with an average of 13.2 percent return for its competitors. The company celebrated this achievement by giving 42,000 of its employees a one-time bonus of 5 percent of their base pay.
After meeting its five-year goal, Chevron continued its cost-cutting and efficiency efforts. In December 1995 the company announced a restructuring of its U.S. gasoline marketing. It combined regional offices, consolidated support functions, and refocused the marketing unit toward service and sales growth. One example of the company's new efforts toward marketing was a joint initiative with McDonald's Corporation. In April 1997, as a response to "one-stop shopping" marketing trends, Chevron and McDonald's together opened a new gas station and food facility in Lakewood, California. The two companies shared the space, and customers could order food and pump gas at the same time. They could pay for the order with a Chevron card. More Chevron/McDonald's facilities were planned for California and elsewhere in the United States.
Chevron also cut its refining capacity, where margins were especially low in the early 1990s. Capacity dropped by 407,000 barrels a day from 1992 to 1995. The company helped reduce its refining capacity by selling its Port Arthur, Texas, refinery in February 1995 to Clark Refining & Marketing Inc. Chevron controlled 10.2 percent of U.S. refining capacity in 1992 but just 7.5 percent by 1995. These measures seemed to improve the company's fortunes, as its earnings jumped in 1996 to more than $2.6 billion, an all-time high. Stockholder return for the year was 28.5 percent. High gasoline prices also contributed to Chevron's huge profits. The company was able to take advantage of high crude prices by increasing production at its Kazakhstan and West African facilities. Also during 1996, Chevron sold its natural gas business to Houston-based NGC Corporation, gaining a 27 percent stake in the Houston-based energy marketer and trader, which changed its name to Dynegy Inc. in 1998. Late in 1997 Chevron sold the marketing side of Gulf Oil (Great Britain) Limited to a unit of Royal Dutch/Shell Group in a deal that included 450 service stations in the United Kingdom and three fuel terminals.
Cracks in the OPEC cartel and more efficient energy exploration technologies led to an oil glut and plunging oil prices in 1998 and 1999. With prices falling to as low as $10 per barrel, several major oil companies responded with a wave of megamergers that transformed the industry. Chevron, however, completed only two smaller acquisitions in 1999, picking up Rutherford-Moran Oil Corporation, a small U.S. independent with proven oil and gas reserves in the Gulf of Thailand, and Petrolera Argentina San Jorge S.A., the number three oil company in Argentina. The company made unsuccessful bids for both Atlantic Richfield Corporation and Amoco Corporation (both of which eventually were subsumed within BP p.l.c., the successor of British Petroleum Company PLC) and entered into advanced merger talks with Texaco in mid-1999. The latter discussions failed at least in part because the two sides could not agree on who should head up the combined firm. Meanwhile, Chevron exited from offshore California production in early 1999 when it sold its share of the Point Arguello project, located offshore near the city of Santa Barbara, and the rest of its California offshore properties to Venoco Inc. At the end of 1999 Derr retired from Chevron after 11 years as chairman and CEO, with Vice-Chairman Dave O'Reilly taking over those positions.
Formation of ChevronTexaco in the New Century
In addition to the spate of megamergers, the period around the end of the millennium was also noteworthy for the number of major joint ventures that were formed between various petroleum companies. For its part, Chevron combined its worldwide chemical operations with those of Phillips Petroleum Company, forming a 50-50 joint venture called Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LLC. Created in July 2000, the new venture began with about $6.1 billion in total assets and $5.7 billion in annual revenues. The two companies anticipated annual cost savings of about $150 million from the combination, partly from the elimination of about 600 positions, or 10 percent of the combined workforce.
A few months after the consummation of this merger, Chevron belatedly joined the megamerger bandwagon with the announcement of the merger of Chevron and Texaco, the longtime Caltex partners. The deal was struck despite the spike in oil prices, which had reached about $30 a barrel by the time of the merger announcement in October 2000, and the paramount rationale for the combination was the potential for substantial cost savings--initial estimates were for $1.2 billion in annual savings. Structured as a Chevron takeover of Texaco, the merger was completed on October 9, 2001, with Texaco shareholders receiving .77 shares of common stock in ChevronTexaco Corporation, the new name adopted by Chevron Corporation. The final value of the deal was $45 billion, including $38.3 billion in Texaco stock and $6.7 billion in Texaco debt. Texaco Inc. became a subsidiary of ChevronTexaco. Also becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of the newly enlarged firm was Caltex Corporation, which had moved its headquarters from Texas to Singapore in 1999 to be closer to its core markets. ChevronTexaco began with a market capitalization of $97 billion, enabling it to join the ranks of the so-called supermajor oil firms, which included Exxon Mobil Corporation, BP, and Royal Dutch/Shell. Headquarters for the company remained in San Francisco, but plans were soon made for a move to a nearby San Ramon business park during 2002. Heading up ChevronTexaco were O'Reilly as chairman and CEO along with two vice-chairmen, Richard Matzke, who had been Chevron vice-chairman, and Glenn Tilton, who had become chairman and CEO of Texaco in February 2001.
In approving the merger, the Federal Trade Commission ordered the divestment of stakes in two refining and marketing joint ventures inherited from Texaco: Equilon Enterprises LLC and Motiva Enterprises LLC. These interests were transferred to a trust prior to completion of the merger. Then in February 2002 Shell Oil Company and Saudi Refining, Inc. purchased the interests for $2.26 billion in cash and the assumption of $1.6 billion in debt. Meanwhile, in October 2001, the development of the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan received a boost when a new pipeline came online. Previously much of the crude oil from the field had been shipped by rail through Russia to the seaport of Ventspils, Latvia. The new 900-mile, $2.6 billion pipeline, built by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, 15 percent owned by ChevronTexaco, ran from the Tengiz field westward through Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. This represented a much less costly form of transportation for exporting the crude oil. Another development in late 2001 came through ChevronTexaco's equity stake in Dynegy. Energy trading giant Enron Corporation was on the verge of bankruptcy, with its stock price plunging, amid allegations of accounting and other improprieties. In November Dynegy announced an agreement to buy Enron for about $9 billion, and ChevronTexaco committed to inject an additional $2.5 billion into Dynegy in support of the merger. With the continuing collapse in Enron's stock price, however, Dynegy canceled the deal later in November. This led to Enron declaring bankruptcy and also suing Dynegy for withdrawing from the takeover, with a countersuit soon following.
The initial postmerger integration efforts led ChevronTexaco to suffer a net loss of $2.52 billion for the fourth quarter of 2001. This included $1.17 billion in charges related to the merger, including severance payments for some of the 4,500 employees who lost their jobs as a result of the merger, facility-closure costs, and other expenses. The company took an additional $1.85 billion in writedowns of energy, mineral, and chemical assets as it looked closely at the combined operations and pared back on investments. ChevronTexaco was now aiming to achieve annual cost savings of $1.8 billion by 2003. For the year, the company reported net income of $3.29 billion on revenues of $104.41 billion. Looking to the future, analysts were expecting the company to pursue another significant acquisition in order to keep up with the other supermajors, each of which continued to grow aggressively. Possible acquisition candidates included Burlington Resources Inc., Conoco Inc., Marathon Oil Corporation, and Phillips Petroleum. Conoco and Phillips, however, soon announced their own merger, although ChevronTexaco was reportedly considering stepping in with an offer for one of the two firms, both of which were attractive as being among the last independent midsize energy concerns.
Principal Subsidiaries: Chevron U.S.A. Inc.; Chevron Capital Corporation; Chevron Pipe Line Company; The Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co.; Chevron Overseas Petroleum Inc.; Texaco Inc.; Chevron Canada Limited; Chevron International Limited (Liberia); Chevron Nigeria Limited; Caltex Corporation (Singapore); Chevron U.K. Limited.
Principal Competitors: Exxon Mobil Corporation; BP p.l.c.; Royal Dutch/Shell Group; TOTAL FINA ELF S.A.
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- Miller, William H., "Chevron Bridges the Gulf," Industry Week, May 12, 1986, pp. 65+.
- Palmer, Jay, "Here Comes Chevron!: The Once-Lagging Oil Giant Steps Up the Pace," Barron's, May 6, 1991, pp. 16+.
- Petzinger, Thomas, Oil and Honor: The Texaco-Pennzoil Wars, New York: Putnam, 1987, 495 p.
- Quirt, John, "Socal Is Looking Homeward," Fortune, March 10, 1980, p. 66.
- Racanelli, Vito J., "Bigger Really Is Better: Benefits of Chevron's Acquisition of Texaco Seem Underappreciated," Barron's, May 28, 2001, pp. 19-20.
- Sampson, Anthony, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made, New York: Viking Press, 1975, 334 p.
- Shannon, James, Texaco and the $10 Billion Jury, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988, 545 p.
- Shao, Maria, "Ken Derr's Got the Money--but What Will He Do With It?," Business Week, September 5, 1988, p. 27.
- Texaco Today: The Spirit of the Star, 1902-1992, White Plains, N.Y.: Texaco Inc., 1992, 40 p.
- Wilson, James W., et al., "The Chevron-Gulf Merger: Does It Still Make Sense?," Business Week, January 21, 1985, pp. 102+.
Source: International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 47. St. James Press, 2002.